








































































































































































































































































































































































































































S/RES/678 (29 November, 1990), para.2. 本稿では “Authorizes”を「授権する」と訳しているが、学















See Shachter 1991, p.462.
松井芳郎教授は、憲章起草過程における議論を根拠として、第 39条の「勧告」が憲章第 6章が
規定する紛争の平和的解決に関する勧告を意味するものであるとし、強制措置の「決定」とは区
別している。松井 1993年、83頁．同様の見解として、Weston 1991, p.521.
See Rostow 1991, p.509, Shachter 1991, pp.459-460.
See Weston 1991, p.519.
See Shachter 1991, p.464, 松井 1993年、73頁 , 最上 1991年、15頁．
松井 1993年、73頁、最上 1991年、15頁。
1992年 1月 31日に開催された安保理サミットの要請に基づいて作成され、同年 6月 17日に提
出された事務総長報告書『平和への課題』において、当時のガリ事務総長は、軍事参謀委員会の
支援を得て、安保理が第 43条に基づいて交渉を開始するよう勧告を行った。See Boutros Boutros-













































Annex to the letter dated 24 February 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany 
and the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2003/214 (24 February 2003).
2003年 2月 24日にフランス、ロシア、ドイツが共同で安保理議長に提出した書簡（S/2003/214）、
及びアメリカ、イギリス、スペインによる武力行使決議案（修正案）に対するロシアやフランス
の反対意見を参照のこと。S/PV.4714 (7 March, 2003), p.18 (Russia) , p.19 (France).
例えば、アメリカ、イギリス及びスペインが提出した武力行使決議案（修正案）への反対意見と
して、S/PV.4717 (11 March, 2003), p.8 (Malaysia), p.9 (South Africa), p.10 (League of Arab States), p.12 
(Algeria), p.25 (New Zealand), p.30 (Indonesia).p.31(Viet Nam), p.34 (Lebanon), S/PV.4717 ( Resumption 1) 
(12 March, 2003), p.8 (Argentina), pp.13-14 (Tunisia), p.18 (Malawi)を参照。
2003年 1月 27日、ならびに 3月 7日に開催された安保理会合において、査察を担当する IAEA
のエルバラダイ氏は、「イラクの核兵器開発再開の証拠は見受けられない」と報告し、また
UNMOVICのブリクス氏は、イラクの査察への協力が不十分としつつも、査察は一定の成果をあ
げていると報告している。なお、2003年 3月 8日付の『朝日新聞』（朝刊）では、2002年 11月
27日の査察開始から 3月 6日まで延べ 780回の査察が行われていたとされており、国際社会によ
るイラクの監視は十分に行なわれていたと言える。
最上 2003年、55頁．
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The Issues Related with the Authorization of the Use of Force under 
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations:
With Focus on the Study of Theories
<Summary>
Naoko Nishiura
Under Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter UN 
Charter), the threat or use of force by the states are prohibited, with the exception 
for the military measures (Article 42) and the right of self-defense (Article 51). 
While Chapter VII states the procedure for the employment military measures in 
details, during the Gulf Crisis, the Security Council chose to authorize the use of 
force by the multilateral coalition forces under the Chapter VII. Such irregular 
measure suggests two problematic issues: firstly, the non-existence of a specific 
legal basis for the authorization by the Security Council in the UN Charter, and 
secondly, that multilateral coalition forces do not satisfy the prerequisite for the 
military measures, especially that of the direct command by the Security Council 
on armed actions. 
Though it is not clear whether the authorization procedure in the Gulf Crisis 
could be justified in the UN Charter or not, the practices of the authorization 
have been accumulating since 1990 and various assessments have been 
published. One strain of studies justifies the authorization based on the specific 
provisions of the UN Charter, on the theory of the implied power, or on the 
formation of the customary rules. The other strain accepts the authorization 
based on the accumulation of the practices without specific objection from the 
member states. However, several have expressed reserves on  the practices of 
the authorization as being far removed from the system under the UN Charter in 





The direct command by the Security Council is not a formal procedure for 
the military measures but the significant element in the Article 2(4), because it 
minimizes the discretion of the member states over their armed actions. Although 
the Security Council resolution does specify the purpose, mandate, and deadline 
of the mandate, outside its direct command, the fact that the member states may 
reserve the discretion on the military action will leads to the gradual erosion of 
Article 2 (4). Therefore, the criticism on the practices of the authorization is not 
that of an impractical “Charter fundamentalists”. It tries to limit the discretion of 
the states on armed forces to prevent the erosion of Article 2 (4).
Another serious problem revealed from the accumulation of practices of the 
authorization is found in relation to the function of Chapter VII. Under Chapter 
VII, the Security Council monopolizes the authority to decide the legal use of 
force. It means that the Security Council approves the legality and legitimacy of 
the armed action by the member states. However, such function of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII has come to be considered mere formal requisite by 
certain states. In most cases of the authorization, only a limited group of states 
(permanent members (P5) or other states which have closed relationship with 
P5) were granted the resolution for the authorization, and in these instances, 
the members of the Security Council had shown little inclination to discuss the 
reasonability of the authorization. Under such interpretation of Chapter VII as a 
formal procedure, we may conclude that Article 2(4) is not deemed applicable 
conduct of all member states. As a result, the erosion of Article 2(4) is as a 
serious issue, that a certain states can formally justify their armed action with 
their wide discretion. 
Seeking the establishment of objective standards and guidelines on the 
authorizing procedure by the Security Council will make a significant and 
necessary contribution to the future of Article 2(4). 

